INTRODUCTION
The concept of security is inseparable from network-based information systems. It has a particular significance for virtual organizations whose activities either strongly or entirely depend on the network access. The safety level of the VO member organisations and their communication influences security of the entire virtual organization. Diversity of approaches to security issues in different virtual organizations is due to a variety of forms of their activities. VO member organizations are often built upon diverse network infrastructures and on diverse platforms (Voster, 2003) . Furthermore, they use different strategies (NIST, 1998) to assure their own security.
Granting access to a member organization's resources to another member organization within the framework of the VO imposes changes on the organization security system. Since the whole VO is as secure as its weakest member organization is, each VO member organization becomes equally responsible not only for its own security, but also for security of common resources. Finding a simple, yet complete definition of the security framework is a real challenge, considering the fact that VO is based on a geographically dispersed information infrastructure, and additionally commonly accessible networks, like the Internet, are used for internal communication within the VO.
The security framework is a set of methods, tools and guidelines that a VO is expected to deploy in order to protect its resources, e.g. data being processed, information on the organisation and its users (system configuration, passwords, etc.), services offered, as well as, the whole infrastructure with its components (computers, network elements, wiring, etc.). An additional requirement is to assure Springer, 2005. the possibility to efficiently manage elements of the security framework. This includes: design, deployment and execution of the VO own security strategy.
In Virtual Organizations: Systems and Practices, L. M. Camarinha-Matos, H. Afsarmanesh, M. Ollus (Editors),
In the following section, main sources of danger to VOs are identified. Further on, we point to security technologies that can provide remedy for the identified threats. Security measures developed and demonstrated by IST projects E-COLLEG (www.ecolleg.org), EXTERNAL (research.dnv.com/external/), PRODNET (www.uninova.pt/~prodnet), and TeleCARE (www.uninova.pt/~telecare) follow. We present in more detail the architecture and its security components that where implemented in the advanced collaborative infrastructure, developed by the EColleg project. In conclusions, we point to some open R&D questions related to the VOs security frameworks.
THREATS TO VOs SECURITY
There are different sources and types of potential threats to VOs security.
Threats caused by an activity aimed at altering the present state of a system. What we mean is any attempt to break the protection in order to illegally use resources, any interference in the processed data, resulting in the data loss. Threats caused by activities not aimed at altering the present state of a system. This group includes eavesdropping and interception attempts which lead to loss of secrecy of the information being processed. Threats resulting from various accidents and errors, as well as malfunction of the system. The first two groups assume the purposeful action aimed at unauthorised access to protected resources and their alteration. A number of techniques are being employed these days to break the protection system (Lockhart,2004) (Peikari and Chuvakin,2004) . The most commonly used techniques are masquerading, eavesdropping, modification of transmitted information, password hacking by force or by a dictionary attack, analysis of traffic in the network, denial of service, code elements modification aimed at gaining access to resources (Burnett,2004) , making use of bugs and errors in the security system (McNab,2004) , social engineering and Trojan horses (Grimes,2001 ). The third group mentioned, apart from system errors contains natural threats such as hardware damage, supply failure, fire, flood, etc.
Some of these threats may be eliminated or minimized by a physical protection of the essential system elements. Such basic precautions as room access monitoring, fire protection, emergency power supply, equipment redundancy, backups, should be taken to protect the system. These measures not only protect, but also enable quick restoration of the system.
It is much more difficult, however, to eliminate or minimize the effects of purposeful action taken by a third party to break the system security. This is due to a wide range of attack techniques that already exist and new ones that are being created, like: viruses or hacking methods.
Apart from a few cases, e.g., denial of service attack or viruses, aggressors try to conceal their trails. Thus, the effects may be unnoticed for a long time.
ELEMENTS OF SECURITY FRAMEWORK
The rising importance of security measures has forced manufacturers to empower operating systems in mechanisms that increase protection of resources they manage. All OSs (Windows, Unix, Linux, etc) have tools that allow configuration of the system reducing danger of potential attacks. However, even the best configured OS is not able to eliminate all risks. Threats identified in previous Section require additional, more sophisticated methods and protection tools, like: firewall systems, antivirus scanners, Virtual Private Network (VPN), Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). These precautions are especially important in case of geographically dispersed systems, as the VOs are.
This calls for a multi-layer security system (Figure1) with the first layer being responsible for minimisation of attack possibilities. The next layer should detect a successful attack and generate proper alarms, while the third one, ought to remove immediately effects of the attack. Unfortunately, not all security systems are designed following this scheme. Dispersed locations of VO member organisations require broadcasting of information not only via local nets but also through the Internet that is commonly regarded as not being safe. A number of potential aggressors and spots they may attack from, increases. Thus, a secure VO should offer a wide range of services enabling effective realization of the security policy.
In this chapter we address the following main techniques for assuring security of virtual organisations:
Communication security with confidentiality and integrity of information being preserved, Authentication of the actor participating in the operation, whether it is a human being or any other available resource, like host or programme, Authorization and access control to resources managed through assignment and verification of actor's privileges, and Security management elements -security policy formation and enforcing its rules through imposing of proper behaviour. Monitoring of the system operation and detecting hazard situations with alarm generation.
Secure communication -data confidentiality and integrity
VO member organizations are usually located at different geographical places. To facilitate information exchange, communication channels have to be established. However, the majority of these channels is beyond protected LANs and is constructed on the basis of common access networks such as the Internet. This gives rise to potential threats. There is a wide range of attack techniques, which aim at breaking confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted information. The most commonly used communication protocol TCP/IP does not have any built-in mechanisms, securing the transmitted information. Confidentiality and integrity assurance need to be shifted to upper layers of the ISO/OSI model. Simultaneous securing of both, confidentiality and integrity, is not always required. In some cases, securing of integrity alone is sufficient. Security of the information exchanged through the virtual communication channel between the VO member organisations may be assured using cryptographic methods. Additionally, mechanisms signalling any attempt at interference in the transmitted data contents are used. . This model is used to secure safe communication by means of such solutions, as IPSec protocol (Scott et al.,1998) , Virtual Private Network (VPN) (Scott et al.,1998) , SSL protocol (wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3), and TSL protocol (Dierks and Allen,1999) . Protection mechanisms can be directly embedded in the application.
Since 1992 the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been working on a new protocol to broaden the functionality and introduce security to the already existing IP protocol. In 1995 the first specification of IP Security (IPSec) was presented which was later improved and completed. The IPSec protocol defines a new set of headers attached to the IP packets., namely: Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP). This protocol can operate in a transport mode or a tunnel mode. They differ from each other in the way the data from higher level protocols is packaged. The IPSec protocol is complemented with the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) (Harkins and Carrel, 1998) negotiating IPSec parameters which are indispensable for the connection to be established.
One vital task of the Virtual Private Network is to enable such an application of the public computer network like the Internet, as if it were private. This can be achieved by means of ciphering methods and integrity securing methods. The Virtual Private Network attempts at combining advantages of public networks (low costs, accessibility) with those of private ones (security). Actually, every Virtual Private Network on the Internet operates on the same basis. The data integrity is ensured through cryptographic hash functions and confidentiality through encryption. The result is packed in new packets.
Once the destination is reached, the packet is properly unpacked. Its contents are decrypted and data integrity is checked. Virtual Private Network is designed based on various protocols, like Point to Point Tunnelling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunnel Protocol (L2TP) and IPSec. IPSec operating in the tunnel mode is the most frequently used solution.
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) was developed in 1993 by Netscape Company in order to secure data integrity and to authenticate servers in the WWW network. It can also authenticate clients using the servers. Like most network protocols, it was modified several times. The most popular version now is SSLv3. Since 1996 Internet Engineering Task Force has been carrying out standardization work on to a new protocol. In 1999 Transport Layer Security (TSL) appeared, based on SSLv3 protocol. TSL and SSL enable authentication of both servers and clients, enciphering of the data between terminal modes and protection of data integrity. A client can be reconnected with the server previously used without renewed authentication and negotiating session keys, on the condition that the reconnection takes place shortly after the previous connection ended.
Authentication
Authentication is a process in which the user identity and the identity of a system element which, either is an information source, or requester of access to resources, should be recognized and verified. With the majority of the present systems, identity has to be verified prior to gaining access to private resources. Successful authentication is a base for other computer provided services such as authorization, access control and communication protection.
In the local environment, responsibility for authentication most frequently lies with the operating system. A user introduces his login name, thus identifying himself, and confirms his identity using a password.
In the VO distributed environment, member organisations can act on behalf of one another. This brings about necessity for repeated authentication through login name and password which is not favourable, particularly if the data transmitted via public network are unprotected. Authentication may concern one or both parties participating in the information. If both parties are authenticated then we call it a mutual authentication. However, using the public key, certificates and the private key technologies enables another approach to the authentication issue.
Central repositories, where credentials of the system elements are stored, enable the parties participating in the authentication process to refer to them. In IPSec in VPN and SSL/TSL protocols used for communication protection, the system elements between which the data are transmitted undergo authentication. In SSL/TSL protocols authentication is done during handshake, which is the initial and the most vital protocol phase. In Virtual Private Network based on IPSec protocol the Internet Key Exchange protocol is used to authenticate the virtual safe channelattached elements of the system.
The above mentioned examples describe the cases when it is necessary to confirm the identity of the two system elements between which the data are exchanged. For the distributed environment with numerous components such solutions as: KryptoKnight (Molova et al., 1997), SPX (Alagappan and Tardo, 1991), or Kerberos (web.mit.edu/kerberos/www) can be used. KryptoKnight is responsible for authentication and key distributing for the units exchanging information in the network environment. It was designed to operate with minimum hardware requirements and without big system resources. It was possible to resign from 'hard' ciphering methods. Instead of one-way hash function and Machine Authentication Code (MAC) were used. It has been developed by both Yorktown Research Laboratories and IBM Zurich.
SPX as an authentication service is meant to be used in the open network environment. It makes use of both public and confidential key technologies. Global principal identities, unambiguously identifying users and servers in the system, are applied in the authentication process. SPX has a hierarchically organized structure of Certification Authorities whose task is to issue public key certificates for a group of logically connected users and servers. The generated certificates together with other information about a user or a server are stored in Certificate Distribution Centre databases (CDC). Each SPX domain should contain at least one CDC server. Both parties undergoing authentication based on the exchanged data and the data received from proper CDC can end the process successfully.
Kerberos has been defined by the Athena project realized by Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. It is applied in large systems with many servers and workstations where users who are not permanently ascribed to the same computer use a great number of distributed resources. In Kerberos, the confidential key technology is used. The user-server communication is enciphered. Resource access is available with limited validity tickets. The client-server communication continues until the ticket validity expires. Every announcement sent between the system elements is enciphered using private keys. Private keys of clients and servers, as well as temporarily generated session keys are applied.
Biometric-based systems
One of more frequently used authenticating methods for confirmation of a person's identity, are biometric techniques. Growing request for exact techniques of identity verification has caused that biometric systems are presently one of the most fast developing domains. Besides, increase in interest in such authenticating methods has reduced greatly accustoming costs. Biometrics-based methods are used for two basic purposes, i.e. to verify or to identify a human being on the basis of his/her biometric data. These data measure the individual's unique physical or behavioral characteristics. Generally, biometric measures are divided into two basic groups: physical and behavioral. Physical techniques identify or verify an individual on the basis of unique characteristics of the human body such as fingerprints, hand or palm geometry, as well as retina, iris, or facial characteristics. Behavioral techniques include signing features, keystroke pattern, voice, gait, etc.
A biometrics identification and verification process relies on the comparison of the analysed and processed characteristics collected by a biometric device to store individual's template. An ideal biometric technique should be characterized by several attributes: uniqueness; resistance to impact of environmental conditions; stability of measured characteristics in the long term; ease of access to measured characteristics; effective, efficient and compact biometric device enabling reliable and easy electronic capture of characteristics measure; fast and efficient algorithms for processing of measured data and comparing them with the stored templates; user acceptance.
As mentioned before, biometric systems can provide both identification and verification processes. Identification is more difficult of the two because a system must search a database of enrolled users to find a match (a one-to-many search). In a verification process measured characteristic is compared with a single template stored locally (e.g. smartcard). Presently known and applicable biometric techniques differ in many parameters (Table1). It means necessity for fitting a proper biometric method for individual demands, environmental conditions, and other applicationspecific parameters. Two terms placed in Table 1 require explanation. False Acceptance Rate (FAR) signifies that a non-registered user gains access to a biometrically protected system. This figure must be sufficiently low to present a real deterrent. False Rejection Rate (FRR) means that a registered user does not gain access to a biometrically protected system after one attempt. One of the interesting uses of biometrics involves combining biometrics with smart cards and public-key infrastructure (PKI). It eliminates a major problem with biometrics, namely, the problem of the way in which the individual' s template should be stored. The template stored in a centralized database is exposed to attack. Storing the template on a smart card enhances individual privacy and increases protection against a potential attack.
Smart cards
A small piece of plastic with a built-in microprocessor, EEPROM, ROM, RAM, and often an encryption coprocessor, has made a career recently (Figure 2 ). Physical and electrical characteristics of smart cards are based on the international standards ISO7810 and ISO7816. Furthermore, several standards and their extensions (e.g. ETSI GSM, EMV) were established to meet the specific needs of the industry (e.g. The smart card operating system is kept in the ROM while the EEPROM is responsible for storage application data and operating system extensions. The RAM is used for carrying out operations. The communication between a smart card and a device that accepts this card is supported by the I/O System. Data can be transmitted from 9.6 to 111 kbits/sec depending on a smart card architecture. The encryption coprocessor supporting encryption/decryption computations completes the smart card architecture. It increases the smart card and communication security level. Recent smart cards with new card operating systems enable application developers to create and download on-card application code on their own. JavaCard, Multos, as well as Windows for Smart Card are the examples. Java Card technology has become an open standard and reached dominance on the market through the last years.
Authorization and Access Control
These are the processes inseparably connected with the information system resources application. Authorization aims at determining and confirming the user's rights to use the resources, whereas the access control verifies the rights and finally decides about granting access. Authorization and access control are possible only after the unit requesting the information system resources access has been authenticated. Introducing satisfactory authorization and access control mechanisms is a challenge. While the increasing popularity of distributed technologies has significantly developed authentication methods, authorization and access control are still lagging behind. Additional complication arises from the fact that with distributed technologies resource access request can only be realized within delegation through mediators acting on behalf of the requesting party.
The Access Control List (ACL) is commonly applied in authorisation and access control processes. This solution was taken from operating systems, ACL connects an object, to which resource access is controlled, with a subject and access rights of pair list. ACL used for authorization and access control is suitable in centralized information systems of the client-sever type. ACL are implemented as databases in which each object possesses a list of subjects with rights. A problem with ACL application may be caused by the scale of the information system. ACL databases replication on different distributed servers may cause problems with the content updating and synchronization.
In the new approach to authorization and access control using authorization certificates, are considered. These are documents with a digital signature containing assertions on the object in question. Certificates may concern user identity, features and conditions of resource usage. They are complemented with components enabling distribution and verification of the certificates and with mechanisms which will properly join the information contained in the certificates and decide about allocation of the resource requested. The Akenti system is a case in point (www.itg.lbl.gov/security/Akenti).
Security management
The aim of every organization is realization of a specific task. It is necessary, however, to foresee situations when a number of factors may appear, hindering the organisation's activity. With organisations that are particularly dependent on information systems, it is vital that systems are well secured. However, application of various forms of protection does not guarantee a proper level of the system safety. The accepted solutions have to fit the profile of the institution activity. Security measures being expensive, potential threats and precautions should be well analysed considering the damages the institution risks if not protected. Taking into account new challenges, as well as dynamically changing environment, security management becomes a must. Security management is a continuous process in ever changing environment with new threats appearing and fast technology progress.
Security policy and the mechanisms used to realize it should be considered in 3 aspects: organizational, legal and technical. A number of rules have been worked out with reference to information security management. One essential document is composed of five parts ISO/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Report 13335 being a basis for national standards in some countries. There are other documents indirectly connected with security management issues, like ISO/ICE BS 17799-2:1999, ISO/IEC 15408. Security management objective and task is to reach and maintain the assumed security level of the information system. The objective is reached if organisation's security policy is carried out. The following measures should be undertaken:
Foreseeing potential threats and estimating the risk of their occurrence as well as their effects; Determining and implementing of indispensable optimal security measures; Monitoring of the system operation; Detecting cases of security rules infringement and reacting to such cases; Running proper training courses.
As mentioned earlier, security management is especially important in dynamically changing environments. New threats, alteration in the organizational structure of institutions, as well as changes in information system configuration, make security management a continuous process. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the risk of losing the proper safety level. The analysis should compromise the value of protected resources, costs of security measures, potential effects. The result should enable selection of the adequate solution keeping the balance between the expenditure and an obtained level of security. To reach and maintain the assured safety level, the staff members should all cooperate as it is people who are usually the weakest link in the security system. At every structural level of the institution the staff should be properly trained to gain awareness of security significance, and be motivated and disciplined as to their behaviour. Even the best designed security systems are not capable to completely eliminate the risk of unforeseeable events affecting the information system. Thus, special emergency procedures are needed. ISO/IEC 17799:2000 "Code of Practice" for information security management gives guidelines useful while making plans for emergency.
SELECTED APPROACHES
This chapter shortly presents approaches towards security in four IST projects, namely: E-COLLEG, EXTERNAL, PRODNET, and TeleCARE. These projects address various safety aspects, considering mainly VO creation and operation phases. Although security was an important issue in all these projects they deploy various approaches to meet their security requirements and minimize potential threats.
Tool Registration and Management System (TRMS) that has been developed by the IST E-COLLEG project is intended for engineers working in distributed environments (Figure 3) . TRMS constitutes an environment that enables agile management and invocation of tools which are distributed in the Internet space. TRMS is accessible through a user friendly GUI that allows management of tools, users and their privileges. A simple workflow editor helps an engineer create distributed workflows , (Fras et al., 2003) .
The TRMS-based security framework presents an interesting alternative to VPN. Experiences of E-COLLEG industrial partners show that in many industrial scenarios VPN cannot be deployed. In companies with a very restrictive security policy and protected by sophisticated systems of firewalls establishment of a VPN communication channel requires reconfiguration of the existing security system and modification of their security policy. If these changes are to be held for a short time only, then the required modifications are usually rejected by security managers as inefficient and risky.
TRMS employs 80 or 8080 ports that are usually used by WWW servers. If these ports are not available, then E-COLLEG ANTS (Advanced Network Transport Services) (Schattkowsky et al., 2004 ) are used to transfer data to/from the protected network. ANTS use the fact that most of the existing firewall systems allow establishment of connections that are initiated from the interior of the protected network.
TRMS also allows transfer of data through the Proxy Server. TRMS requires neither changes in configuration of the existing firewalls nor installation of additional components. One can use the system upon installation of the Client program. Management of keys has been simplified. A client has a pair of his own keys only (public and private) that are stored in a password protected file, as well as, the public key of the GTLS server. Since in the process of authentication the identity of a user is to be confirmed, and not the one of the machine that he works on, the user can login to the system from any computer with the Client application installed.
E-COLLEG TRMS
Secure communication -Data confidentiality in TRMS is realized through utilization of cryptographic methods. Design data are encrypted at the time of transport. Encryption with the public key method, as well as, encryption with the symmetric key method is used simultaneously.
-Data integrity is assured through utilization of cryptographic methods and the digital signature technology. Interchanged data are encrypted and digitally signed. Any interference into carried data made them illegible and result in rejection by a recipient. Controlled access to common resources -Authentication is accomplished in the course of logging to the system with utilization of login name, password and a digital signature. Unique number of a session is created, and later on it is used with the digital signature for affirmation of identity.
-Authorization -user database stores crucial information on users. Due to a flexible system of privileges user rights to access common resources are identified.
-Access control -direct execution of granted privileges and a definitive decision about access to resources. Collaboration through existing firewalls -SOAP protocol and well-known ports number 80 or 8080 are used for communication. In particular cases, Advanced Network Transport Service (ANTS) allows collaboration in firewall systems presence. Mechanisms for security management -capability to forcing appropriate security policy. Influence on behaviour of users and current control of the system operation. All events relevant for system security are registered.
www.ecolleg.org/ Figure 3 -The E-COLLEG TRMS-based security framework.
The objective of the EXTERNAL project is to support establishment of extended enterprises (EE) that are characterized by a dynamic and limited in time cooperation of business partners. EXTERNAL solutions support effective cooperation through a dedicated methodology, infrastructure and tools, as well as business solutions for EE modeling, analysis, engineering and operation. The client-server architecture was used with an Internet browser as a client interface. The HTTP/HTTPS protocol and XML are deployed as the data exchange formats. Secure transmission is guaranteed by the SSL protocol. Authentication and authorization of users are indispensable. Authentication is done through login with a password. A manner of assignment of resource access privileges to and their scope are determined by EXTERNAL tools, eg. Metis or XCHIPS. The infrastructure allows grouping of users with the same privileges and requirements. Management of data concerning users and their privileges is possible through an administrative service. The data that are stored on the server side can be ciphered however it is assumed that DBs have sufficient proprietary protection mechanisms. On the client side, ciphering of the stored data is also possible, as Windows 2000 is the recommended OS.
EXTERNAL
Secure communication -data integrity and confidentiality is assured through deployment of the SSL protocol for data transmission. Authentication -a user is authenticated with the use of login name and password. The SSL protocol authenticates machines that exchange data. Authorization and Access control -each system component and tool has its own methods. EXTERNAL supports a model that allows to group users with similar privileges and requirements. It assumes use of the firewall system with the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Servers are placed within this zone. The intelligent infrastructure developed by the EXTERNAL project assumes use of the firewall system with the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with servers that are placed in this zone (Figure 4) . Application of the domain controller and login to the domain would allow one-off user authentication by a login process. In this case, a user would be authorized individually by system components, e.g. DBs, using their specific authorization methods. Since the situation where all system elements (from the servers side) are in one local network may be difficult in realization, it is foreseen that a user can be authenticated a number of times (External Project, 2002) .
research.dnv.com/external/
A configurable framework with new technological solutions supporting telesupervision and tele-assistance for the elderly community, was the main objective of the TeleCARE project (Camarinha-Matos and Afsarmanesh, 2002) The security system has been designed in such a way that all its components are entirely independent from each other and from other elements of the architecture. This allows to add/remove particular components depending on chosen security measures. Very sensitive data which are handled must be kept secret and integral. Furthermore, diversity of actors (elderly, care workers, health workers, elderly relatives, etc) that use the TeleCARE infrastructure 1 calls for very solid authentication and authorization, as well as data access control. A range of assigned privileges should be adequate to the actor's role. In the TeleCARE project smart cards storing digital certificates necessary to authenticate the user to the VPN are used ( Figure 5) . A secure communication channel is created by VPN. VPN is built based on the IPSec protocol that is extended by ISAKMP or IKE protocols which negotiate connection parameters, as well as authenticate both sides of the communication channel. TeleCARE resources are protected through a firewall system and a system which detects intruders.
TeleCARE
The TeleCARE project requires advanced system of firewalls in order to protect its resources. An open platform that employs new emerging standards and advanced technologies in communication, information management, and distributed decision making has been the objective of the project "Production Planning and Management in an Extended Enterprise" (PRODNET). The developed platform which is mainly directed to SMEs supports entrepreneurs in their business relations, assuring required security measures, like: data confidentiality and integrity, authentication, availability of services, non-repudiation and auditing. The majority of these measures are implemented in the Security Module (PCI component) (Osório et al., 1999 ) of the PRODNET architecture 1 . The PCI component assures among others: secure communication, also with legacy systems, and secure access from a Web client. Cryptographic methods are used in order to assure secure communication. A secure communication channel is established with the simultaneous use of symmetric and public key encryptions. The digital signature technology assures data integrity and user authentication ( Figure 6 ).
PRODNET
The PRODNET Communication Infrastructure (PCI) offers enterprises a communication medium supporting the most important security requirements. Secure communication is assured by the Security Module, component of the PCI architecture. Data confidentiality is achieved through utilization of cryptographic techniques. The encryption with the public key method, as well as encryption with the symmetric key method are used simultaneously. Data integrity is guaranteed through the digital signature technology. A generated digital signature enables receiver to verify integrity of the received message. Authentication is also based on the digital signature technology. In this way the receiver can confirm authenticity of the sender. Certificates essential for authentication and secure communication are managed by the PRODNET infrastructure. PRODNET Web Proxy. Anyone can access to PRODNET information from a standard Web client. The connection is done through the Web proxy. First, Web proxy authenticates the user and depending on the credentials decides about user's access level. Next, a virtual channel between user's browser and the PRODNET node is established. The above presented security frameworks were developed for different domains (engineering, health care, production planning and management, etc.) and for different groups of users. However, they are all entirely dependent on the network infrastructure and focus on security solutions that need to be adequate to threats stemming from the operation over the Internet.
Application of diverse measures for reaching similar objectives, like: secure communication (E-COLLEG TRMS and PRODNET -encryption; TeleCARE -VPN; EXTERNAL -SSL) or authentication (E-COLLEG TRMS, and PRODNETdigital signature; TeleCARE -smartcards; EXTERNAL -login name and password) shows that designers have various solutions at their disposal. The final choice depends on project specificity and on existing infrastructure.
CONCLUSIONS
Securing Virtual Organizations is a complex endeavor that has three dimensions: technical, organizational, and a legal one. Although, in this chapter we concentrate on technical issues, the remaining organizational and legal 2 ones are equally important for a consistent, robust and secure infrastructure for the Virtual Organization. Organizational and legal issues are relevant for VO member organization privacy. Here policies for definition of information flows in the organization which involve VO customers and the legal solutions adopted are central. Of course, privacy relies also on information security. Assurance of security is not a single act, but rather it is a process, as apart from already existing sources of threats, new dangers are constantly appearing that need to be correctly recognized and neutralized. In the second section, the main sources of potential threats have been recognized, and in the following sections techniques for elimination of these threats have been addressed. The choice of the most adequate security framework for a particular Virtual Organization depends to some extent, on the operation domain of the VO. This choice is also influenced by the fact that VO member organizations have their own information systems and are not always able to deploy particular new techniques without interfering with their existing solution. In E-Colleg for example, the project industrial partners were not able to accept VPN and SSL to secure communication with external partners. Instead, E-Colleg own technology ANTS needed to be developed and deployed.
Section four contains solutions to security requirements in four projects. They illustrate that with different methods one may achieve required security level and that the VO operation specificity determines resources that must be especially well protected.
Although the security issue draws lots of attention, both in VO related research and generally in IT, there are still challenges that must be addressed in the near future in order to stimulate further proliferation of collaborative networks and based on them VOs. The identified open issues are:
improved harmonisation between security and collaboration technologies, credible assessment of a security level in VO, seamless coordination among diverse security applications being deployed, more balanced development of new security-relevant applications.
Inter-organizational collaboration over the firewall systems is the security issue that still remains a challenge. Here, two technological efforts appear as orthogonal. On the one hand, each organization aims at the strongest possible protection of its own resources, on the other hand, the same organization would often like to enter a close collaboration. There are no good general solutions available now for this case, although E-Colleg demonstrates here an interesting contribution. Assessment of a security framework through creation of a universal and possibly complete system for measuring security level through, e.g. benchmarking would help with designing more secure VOs. There exist tools that test sensitivity of a VO towards a particular attack (e.g., port scanners, pass breakers), though no complex assessment is feasible as it comprises a multitude of different factors.
With many diverse applications being deployed within the security framework, their inappropriate configuration might cause potential threats to the VO security. An interesting challenging solution would be introduction of a security coordination module that will supervise all security applications deployed in the VO. It would constitute an intermediate layer between the VO infrastructure and the applications and the only place, where all parameters essential for security will be defined. This short survey allows for a conclusion that a large number of techniques and technologies are currently available for securing operation of Virtual Organizations. However, it must also be observed that development of new methods and tools intended for at particular security elements is unbalanced in terms of innovation and suitability for a particular type of VO. Methods securing communication (like, new AES ciphering algorithms, quantum cryptography) or new authentication techniques (smartcards, biometrics) are being developed much faster than say techniques for access control to resources.
